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Agricultural Land Property Market Equilibrium Analysis


Abstract: Since 1978, rural land reform has, after twenty years of development, China's rural land market in the diversified forms of land as a factor of production and increasingly highlighted. In the West there are few of the many theoretical analysis of the current system of property rights of agricultural land market equilibrium, and therefore, this article Share Tenancy Zhang Wuchang in the amendment based on the theory, to construct a transaction cost is considered fixed tenancy theory. And that analysis of the current property market in agricultural land of different modes and features. Finally, to draw general conclusions, make relevant policy recommendations. Chinese papers League finishing. Keywords: rent; transaction costs; agricultural property Analysis of Equilibrium for Farmland's Property Rights Market in China - A Rent Model under Positive Transfaction Cost Abstract: Many kinds of types of manage has been coming out in farmland market in China since the reform on farmland began in 1978.But there are not some effective theories to analyse the equilibrium of it systematically among domestic and forEign economic theories. The refore I design a quota-rent theory under positive transfaction cost, based on modifing the rate-rent theory designed by Zhang Wuchang, and analyse the types and characteristics of the present different farmland's property rights market.Finally, the study comes to a general conclusion and gives some suggestions. Key words: Rent; Transfaction cost; Farmland's property rights One, of the problem since rural land reform in 1978 has, after twenty years of development, China's rural land markets have emerged in the uniformed soil, the contract system, the two field system, farm system, circulation system, stock and other form of management, land increasingly highlighted as a factor of production out of the strict traditional full public ownership of agricultural land began to change the system. Property rights system on agricultural research, some of the West provides us with a rich theory of reference. Si Weituo Bazar Ping Covic believes that private ownership including the right to use the proceeds and punishing the price of the two sides agreed to use all or part of the right of usufruct rights transferred to others, while the property is scarcity of goods between the existence of the cause, the relationship associated with its use. Ping adhering to the concept of property rights Covic thought Fischer, Fischer (1923) that: not a tangible thing or something, but abstract social relationships. the income to enjoy the right to interfere Agricultural land property rights in the balance in the market, Zhang Wuchang for us to make an outstanding contribution in the 60's he criticized the early Marshall and other economists point of view on the share tenancy is invalid, that a fixed tenancy into tenancy and as effective as greatly enriched the theory of tenancy. ① on the ownership of agricultural land reform, some of our economists have done some research and put forward relevant proposals. If Zhang Peigang to claim under the conditions of the implementation of In addition, many scholars advocate from Western experiences and practices to regulate my ownership of agricultural land market. However, because the characteristics of gradual reform in China, our full new and effective system of property rights of agricultural land to be formed. Study of Chinese and foreign scholars and the practical point of view, I found that very few people on China's agricultural land property rights system model of market analysis. Although Zhang Wuchang was divided into tenancy by the theory of our empirical study made in some places, but that is very old thing, and he assumed that his basic model of zero transaction costs and so on so forth, need complement and develop further. I think we should be in-depth analysis of the agricultural land property market of the various participants in the stakes, and the resulting changes related to implementation of the system before they can grasp from the macro-system of rural land property rights reform. Purpose of this article also here. Zhang Wuchang this amendment into the tenancy based on the theory, we construct a positive into account transaction costs theory of the fixed tenancy, and that analysis of the current property market in agricultural land of different modes and features. Second, the agricultural land property rights market equilibrium model (a) of the basic model theory of sub-scale tenancy into tenancy tenancy theory and the theory both in the economic analysis of the equilibrium is consistent here only the fixed tenancy theory. We assume: (1) there are only two homogeneous factors of production, land (h) and labor (t), and the two elements can be freely traded in the market; (2) there are positive transaction costs. Steven Cheung is defined as transaction costs, costs, supervision and management costs and the cost of changing the institutional arrangements. transaction costs faced by the denoted Tc = Tc (h, l), l is the lessee of the selected number of landlords. They are property rights and agricultural land directly and indirectly related to a number of factors (h, m, etc.) function, but the two are not necessarily symmetrical; (3) the same production function, assumed to be: q = q (h, t); Under these assumptions, the tenant and the landlord signed the lease specified in the contract amount and the rent of land (g) bound to the same time to reach equilibrium. The lessee assumes the lease each equal amount of land, land owned by the landlord set the total amount of H, then there is h = H / m then rent the total Z = m · g, land revenue is R = m · g-To. Under competitive conditions, Wt = q-g-Tc (Wt t is the lessee of the market total amount of labor wages). This means that the lessee if not rented land, then sell their labor in the market, he received compensation income must be at least that he rented the land net. This way, the landlord of the problem to be solved is: In the competitive constraints, how to choose m, g and t so that the maximum land revenue R, which max.R = (m · g-To). Build a Lagrangian expression, the problem is to maximize This shows that in equilibrium each contractor the total rented area of ​​land rent is equal to the marginal product multiplied by the rented The land area with the landlord in the choice of the lessee on the marginal cost of transaction costs. ⑷ available from the equation,, the lessee sell their labor in the market wage rate is equal to the marginal product of land cultivation. Available by the equation ⑸, that, in equilibrium, the landlord of all land rent units for rental and the landlord arising from the last unit of land transaction cost, and equal to all the lessee of the land rented marginal output and the last unit of land for the lease transaction costs arising from the difference between and. Finally, the solutions of the equation ⑴, ⑶, ⑸ too,, that, in equilibrium, the rent the lessee in a proportion of total output is equal to the lessee, net of transaction costs and labor costs, earnings after share in the total output is equal to the output elasticity of land (), select the lessee with the landlord of transaction costs arising from the elastic () and the transaction costs in the total output share of the product ②, equal to the land select a specific output elasticity minus the lessee of the land transaction costs arising from the flexibility and the transaction costs in the total output minus the product of the share of the landlord to make the land of the lessee to select a specific transaction costs arising The transaction cost elasticity and the share of total output volume. (B) that the geometric interpretation of the geometric Figure 1, the abscissa, said quantity of land, vertical axis, the average land output and marginal product, here only discuss the case of a tenant. q / h, the average arable land that the lessee output, C / h than the land that the lessee can invest outside of the total cost divided by land area (C = Wt + Tc + f, f is outside of farming land and labor input costs). We assume that the total investment remains the same lessee, so C / h is convex to the original point of a hyperbola. q / h and the C / h the vertical distance between the limits of the (q-C) / h curve, namely, rent per unit of land. In the case of freedom of contract, the landlord will rent income received by the largest tenant will also received the largest farming income, so both will be in the g 'point of equilibrium. From a tenant perspective, in order to maximize revenue, he would use the land to the q / h = To / h + Tc / h of that point, when the tenant's income just to compensate for the land the land around the last two unit of land of transaction costs, but this time the tenant's rent per unit of land will be higher than the average income of land, higher marginal product of the land. Conversely, if the leased area of ​​less than T1T1, the average tenant income did not reach the most, he either received from other landlords, lack of land there, share, or change the non-land factor and land elements of the input ratio, or give up rent for other economic activities. Therefore, the lease of the tenant household size and land rent per unit of land must be in the (q-C) / h, q / h-To / h-Tc / h at the intersection with T1T1 equilibrium. At this point, the rent charged to the landlord can charge to the maximum. Landlord and the tenant of the land revenue has reached the maximum. Figure 1 if transaction costs equal to zero (Tc = To = 0), then the landlord's rent income will increase. The figure (dotted line) that is, C / h curves down into a (f + Wt) / h, (q-C) / h move into (q-f-Wt) / h, q / h - To / h-Tc / h move into q / h, the new equilibrium point g 'point just above. At this point, that this conclusion Zhang Wuchang designed with zero transaction costs into tenancy when the equilibrium is the same. ③ (c) supplement that is fixed in case of transaction costs theory is the basic idea of ​​tenancy: landlord and lessee signing, implementation and maintenance of tenancy contracts is transaction costs, both parties proceeds from the land compensation, the principle by the parties in the amount of land rent and rent to be reflected in the choice of the final equilibrium achieved between the two conditions in a particular constraint to maximize their respective gains. Below, I discuss some of the conditions will be relaxed. First,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych], not all tenants have the same productivity, other things being equal, there is higher productivity of tenants able to withstand the higher rent, so landlords are more willing to lease such land to tenant farmers. However, because the presence of transaction costs, landlords will be higher productivity of land leased to tenant farmers do not necessarily get higher returns than the original, therefore, the same landlord may also have different levels of productivity and many tenant farmers signed a contract with a tenant has may be signed with multiple landowners. Second, there is the factor of land output function technology, human capital, so rent should also consider their prices and transaction costs related to cost. Third, not all factors of production are homogeneous, therefore the same rent landlords may have different standards, different quality of the workers may have different price points the market wage. Fourth, not all factors of production can be in the market and free movement, which will affect supply and demand factors of production, thereby affecting landlords and tenants of their respective bargaining power. Fifth, not all non-land farming costs borne by the tenant, such as irrigation facilities, agricultural machinery, may be shared by the two parties, then the amount of the landlord's rent will be increased accordingly. Sixth, the relevant laws, regulations, traditional practices, such as specific tissues and unexpected shocks will affect the negotiations between landlord and tenant and contract related matters. In addition, the transaction costs difficult to measure and so on. Taking into account the above factors, the landlord and the tenant agreed rent per household and the total amount of soil will be different, in theory, equilibrium is difficult to achieve. Therefore, the actual situation is, the majority of the workers, the business standard is not whether he understood the marginal output, and whether he made money so that he can continue to operate. But the theory is an effective method, it can help us analyze the interests of both gain and loss of tenancy, to find the relevant form of agricultural land property rights system, the existence of the power and the future direction of change. In the following text, I will help of this tool from the theoretical analysis of the specific property is currently agricultural land and several models exist in the market and its characteristics.